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The United States expelled 35 Russian diplomats at the end of December over claims that Russia
had interfered in the US election. But is Russia’s strategy in the West really having a tangible
impact on political outcomes and, if so, how should the West respond? Linda Risso writes that the
West’s apparent weakness to Russian inﬂuence stems from a lack of political, economic and
cultural cohesion, alongside a lack of direction when it comes to organising our multicultural and
multi-ethnic societies.
With an unclassiﬁed US intelligence report indicating that Russia sought to help Donald Trump win the presidential
election, ‘Putinism’ is now on everybody’s lips. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s President, has been portrayed more widely
as a puppet master orchestrating wide-ranging cyber operations, surprise military exercises, and propaganda
campaigns. The Economist recently published a special report that puts Putinism in context by placing it within the
demographic, cultural and societal development of Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. The overall picture is
that while the man himself keeps his cards close to his chest, his track record shows he has a good eye for
identifying the West’s weaknesses, and a natural gift for ﬁnding new ways to sharpen divisions and to widen the
gaps within the West.
At a more profound level, Russia’s actions are seen as capitalising on the internal divisions of western societies. It
exploits fears of globalisation and immigration, it foments resentment against ethnic and religious minorities, and it
encourages criticism against established political parties as cosmopolitan urban elites that have allegedly lost touch
with the real problems faced by real people. In other words, Russia wants the West to turn on itself: public against
elites, religious and ethnic groups against each other, elites against experts, countries against their neighbours. A
divided West is less clear about what it stands for and less eager to step in to protect its values and its allies.
There’s a distinctly active element to this strategy. For example, Buzzfeed has uncovered the extent to which Italy’s
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anti-establishment Five Star Movement have built up a network of websites and social media accounts to spread
fake news, conspiracy theories, and pro-Kremlin stories to millions of Italians. Elsewhere, Marine Le Pen’s
traditionally strapped-for-cash National Front, which feeds on a similar anti-establishment and populist platform,
allegedly received a multimillion euro loan from Russian banks to ﬁnance its presidential and parliamentary
campaigns in 2017.
Where anti-establishment movements are less powerful, Russia plays an altogether diﬀerent kind of game. Markku
Mantila, the head of the Finnish government’s communication department, has stated that they are becoming
increasingly worried about Russian questioning of the legality of Finland’s 1917 independence. In the Baltic
Republics, there is widespread concern about Russian media coverage galvanising Russian minorities within their
own borders.
In parts of the Balkans, Putin is also enjoying strong support. As Dimitar Bechev explains, Russia knows how to
make highly symbolic gestures: blocking a UN Security Council draft resolution describing the 1995 Srebrenica
massacre as genocide, or abstaining from a UN vote to extend the mandate of the EU’s peacekeeping mission in
Bosnia, EUFOR. The real signiﬁcance of taking a stand on these issues is negligible, but it goes a long way toward
ensuring the support of nationalist-minded Serbs and sewing divisions and tensions in the Balkans.
According to Andrew Parker, the incumbent head of MI5, Russia’s propaganda machine poses a real threat: troll
farms, running around the clock, allegedly use social media and blogs as part of a continuous attempt to disrupt and
manipulate news reporting. The head of Germany’s BND foreign intelligence service Bruno Kahl recently argued
that Europe, and Germany in particular, are the primary focus of Russian cyberattacks.
Brexit is a slightly diﬀerent story. It is not Russian-made, but it is deﬁnitely playing into Russian hands. Brexit
absorbs the British government’s energies and attention, and a high proportion of Westminster resources are
focused on the technicalities of triggering Article 50 and on new trade deals. On the continent, Brexit galvanises
Eurosceptics and builds on the frustration of those who feel that they have been ‘left behind’ by globalisation. All this
at a time when Europe faces the most challenging migration crisis since the end of WWII, and needs to navigate
through a phase of deep economic transformation.
Diﬀerent countries, diﬀerent strategies. Yet, the pattern is the same: divide, undermine and embarrass the West. So
what should the West do? Should we be concerned? Contrary to the logic of the Cold War, Russia today does not
embody an alternative economic and political ideology. Rather, Putin ﬁghts for the survival of his government, which
he feels is the only one in a position to ensure the future of Russia. If the West is weak and divided, if Russians see
it as morally corrupt and politically chaotic, Russia’s own shortcomings are less marked. Once again in Russian
history, foreign policy is primarily a tool for the control of power at home.
Ultimately, Putin is playing a rather old-fashioned power game, admittedly with an interesting mix of old and new
tools. Internet trolling, fake news, cyberattacks, support for extremist groups, and even links with mainstream
political parties, are all part of a coherent strategy to expose the idiosyncrasies and hypocrisies of the West and to
widen existing rifts.
An essential point to keep in mind is that despite Putin’s bravado, he is not a gambler. In fact, he is considered a
rather cool-headed pragmatist who – in the good Russian tradition – respects power when he sees it. When faced
with a strong stand, Putin adapts, and circumvents the obstacle. He does not push tensions to a point of no return
because he knows Russia’s inner weaknesses.
As Putin will nudge until he ﬁnds resistance, the West must show that it remains committed to defending itself, on all
levels. NATO’s commitment to increase its military presence in the Baltic Republics goes in the right direction.
However, western governments should never forget that all Russian leaders have always been sensitive to anything
that can be perceived as a provocation and humiliation. Political and diplomatic dialogue must remain at the top of
the agenda and they must go in tandem with a strong military presence. And this must happen not at ambassadorial
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level, as NATO prefers, but at the level of heads of states, which is the only one Putin – and all Russian leaders
before him – recognise as worth pursuing.
But it is essential to understand that the West’s weakness is born out of our own lack of political, economic and
cultural cohesion, of our patchy understanding of the consequences of long-term geopolitical shifts like globalisation
and massive migration, and of our lack of direction about how to organise our multicultural and multi-ethnic societies.
Edward Lucas – one of the most inﬂuential Kremlin observers – has argued that while the West is not militarily or
economically weak, it is “weak willed”. The West does not have a convincing narrative of what it stands for and why:
we stand up for democracy but we do not know to what extent, for example, the right to free speech should be
restricted to ensure that all groups are represented but not threatened.
In order to be able to respond eﬀectively to Russian trolling, it is not suﬃcient to silence the trolls themselves.
Governments and civil society must put forward a strong narrative of what it means to live a western democracy
today. Schools and universities must teach students how to deal with the information they ﬁnd on the internet, how to
recognise reputable sources and how to know the diﬀerence between being entitled to an opinion and understanding
the value of expertise, evidence-based thinking and adopting a long-term perspective.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. Featured image: Vladimir Putin answers questions from Russian journalists
following the BRICS Summit, October 2016. Credits: President of Russia. 
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